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ABSTRACT
Effective anomaly resolution in the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) of the 
International Space Station (ISS) requires consideration of risk in the process of 
identifying faults and developing corrective actions.  Risk models such as fault 
trees from the ISS Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) can be used to support 
anomaly resolution, but the functionality required goes significantly beyond what
the PRA could provide.  Methods and tools are needed that can systematically
guide the identification of root causes for on-orbit anomalies, and to develop 
effective corrective actions that address the event and its consequences without 
undue risk to the crew or the mission.  In addition, an overall information
management framework is needed so that risk can be systematically incorporated
in the process, and effectively communicated across all the disciplines and levels 
of management within the space station program.  The commercial nuclear power 
industry developed such a decision making framework, known as the critical safety
function approach, to guide emergency response following the accident at Three 
Mile Island in 1979.
This report identifies new methods, tools, and decision processes that can be 
used to enhance anomaly resolution in the ISS Mission Evaluation Room.  Current
anomaly resolution processes were reviewed to identify requirements for effective
real-time risk and fault management.  Experience gained in other domains,
especially the commercial nuclear power industry, was reviewed to identify
applicable methods and tools.  Recommendations were developed for next-
generation tools to support MER anomaly resolution, and a plan for implementing
the recommendations was formulated.  The foundation of the proposed toolset will
be a “Mission Success Framework” designed to integrate and guide the anomaly
resolution process, and to facilitate consistent communication across disciplines 
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Real-Time Risk and Fault Management in the Mission 
Evaluation Room for the International Space Station 
SUMMARY
The recent loss of the space shuttle Columbia and her crew has highlighted the critical importance of 
risk and fault management for manned space missions. It is possible that for this event nothing could 
have been done once the vehicle was launched to prevent this tragedy.  We will not know this until the 
investigation has clearly identified the cause of the accident.
For many on-orbit events however, effective tools to assess anomalies and identify and evaluate 
alternative corrective actions are absolutely essential.  It is impossible to pre-analyze all possible events 
that could occur, or to train for recovery from each of them.  No matter how rigorous the pre-analysis,
there will always be a residual set of events and recovery actions left unaccounted for.  In some cases the 
ability to analyze events as they occur on-orbit could mean the difference between life and death, or 
between success and failure of a mission.
Various tools have been developed to model and quantify the risks associated with human space 
flight. These are used primarily in the pre-launch phase, as aids to assess the overall risks of a particular 
vehicle or mission.  When sufficient details are included in the risk models, they can be used to support 
design decisions, and to guide the development of contingency procedures for off-normal or emergency
situations.
However, the application of such tools in real-time (i.e. in time to develop effective corrective actions 
for an ongoing anomaly) is a much more difficult proposition.  Risk models developed pre-launch tend to 
represent a few envelope-defining scenarios, rather than the full spectrum of events that could occur in-
flight.  They typically model an assumed vehicle design that is “frozen in time,” and are very difficult to 
update for the continually evolving states of a vehicle on-orbit.  The models most commonly used for risk 
assessment are failure oriented fault trees, which are better suited to identifying the causes of faults rather 
than identifying and evaluating possible corrective actions for an incident in progress.  For these reasons 
it will be necessary to modify and supplement currently available models and tools for effective use in 
real time for on-orbit anomalies.
The commercial nuclear industry was forced to take a hard look at the prevailing real-time risk and 
fault management paradigm following the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power 
plant (NPP) in Pennsylvania.  Prior to TMI, large risk models had been developed to support Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) for quantifying the risks of nuclear power plant operations, and to compare those 
risks to more familiar risks such as cigarette smoking and commercial air travel.  Emergency procedures 
for nuclear power plants were organized around the response to certain pre-analyzed “design basis 
accidents” (DBAs).  Selecting a response for an ongoing event depended on an accurate classification of 
the origin of the specific event in progress.  Risk models were rarely used as effective tools to support
detailed design or operational decisions, and they were not available at all for real-time use in the case of 
an actual accident such as the one at TMI.
Post-accident investigations of Three Mile Island focused on the inadequacy of information in the 
control room for assessment of the event and selection of corrective actions.  More effective use of 
various kinds of decision making tools including risk models was suggested as one way to address this 
serious shortcoming in real-time risk and fault management in nuclear power plants.  Following TMI 
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focused research programs were organized around the world to explore different approaches for the 
management of real-time anomalies in nuclear power plants.
One of the most significant outcomes of the Three Mile Island accident was the development of a new 
philosophy of operations that focused on mission success rather the prevailing event-oriented approach 
that focused on identification and treatment of specific event scenarios.  This new paradigm was referred
to as the Critical Safety Function approach, and was based on success-oriented logic models rather than 
the failure models that were the logical foundation of the event-based approach.  When both success and
failure approaches were combined in the new Emergency Procedure Guidelines for nuclear power plants, 
the result was a robust approach for real-time risk and fault management.  Although such an approach has 
been implemented in various forms in the procedures of nuclear power plants in the United States since
TMI, implementation of computer-based systems to support emergency response has been much more
limited.  This is partly due to the conservative regulatory stance taken by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), which wanted to ensure that the introduction of computer-based tools did not 
introduce new hazards into reactor operations.  Thus the effectiveness of these tools has not yet been fully
demonstrated in U.S. nuclear power plants.  Implementation of computer-based tools in operating 
facilities has been more aggressive in other countries such as France, Germany, and Japan.  Even so, the 
full potential of these tools remains unproven, because of the challenges of integrating computerized
decision aids with human decision-making capabilities.  The strengths of both human and computer must
be effectively combined for successful performance of the overall problem solving process.  This would 
be very difficult in the time-pressured but localized decision environment of the nuclear power plant 
control room.  The distributed nature of real-time fault and risk management decisions for space 
operations will present different but equally significant challenges.
We believe that the effective integration of success-based models such as Critical Safety Functions 
with fault-based models such as fault trees, and their implementation in a computer-based form, has the 
potential to enhance real-time risk and fault management for space vehicles such as the Space Shuttle and 
the International Space Station (ISS).  This report explores the possible application of these risk-based 
tools for use in the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) for the International Space Station.  An integrated 
approach called the Mission Success Framework for real-time risk and fault management in the MER is 
described, as well as preliminary steps needed to develop and implement tools based on this approach. 
BACKGROUND
NASA tasked the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) to evaluate 
anomaly resolution activities and processes within the ISS Mission Evaluation Room, and to develop 
recommendations and initial steps to implement software-based support for real-time risk and fault 
management in the MER.
The Safety and Mission Assurance/Program Risk Branch of the International Space Station Program
Office envisions three phases for implementing risk analysis capabilities for ISS: 
1. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for performing trade studies and sensitivity analyses for 
different ISS increments.
2. A fault tree tool for performing fault isolation and failure analysis for ISS operations.
3. The Risk Monitor, an integrated risk analysis tool for real-time monitoring.
Phase 1 of this sequence is already being implemented in the form of PRAs that have been performed 
for various increments of ISS assembly.  Phase 2 has begun with the initial development of the Galileo 
fault tree tool for use in fault isolation and failure analysis in the ISS Mission Evaluation Room.
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However, the application of Galileo to these tasks is only beginning at the present time, and much
remains to be done before Galileo can serve as a full-featured tool for fault isolation and failure analysis.
Phase 3, the development of the ISS Risk Monitor, has not yet begun. 
One major objective of this project is to identify the remaining steps required to achieve Phase 2 of 
the planned risk assessment program, i.e. what additional functionality must be added to Galileo to 
comprise a full capability for fault isolation and failure analysis for the MER. 
Another major objective of this project is to identify the high-level functions of the Phase 3 Risk
Monitor, and to identify the initial steps for moving from the Phase 2 Galileo tool currently available to 
the fully integrated Risk Monitor. 
PROJECT ORGANIZATION
Document review
The first task of this project was to review the documents that govern real-time risk and fault 
management in the ISS Mission Evaluation Room. This review focused on the following documents:
x Safety and Mission Assurance/Program Risk Mission Evaluation Room Console Operations 
Handbook for the International Space Station Program, SSP 50437 Revision C, August 2002. 
x On-Orbit Anomaly Resolution Process Work Instruction, MGT-OA-019, Baseline, May 7, 2002. 
x ISS System Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) Work Instruction, MGT-OA-018 Basic, February
2002.
x Probabilistic Risk Assessment of the International Space Station Phase III – Stage 12A.1 
Configuration, Futron Corporation, June 2001. 
x International Space Station Familiarization, Mission Operations Directorate Space Flight Training 
Division, TD9702, Revision B, CPN-1, October 18, 2001.
x System specific training manuals from the Space Flight Training Division series listed above. 
Data Collection Visits 
The second phase of the project was data collection in the Mission Evaluation Room in the Mission 
Control Center (MCC) at the Johnson Space Center (JSC).  Two data collection visits were conducted. 
The first occurred on June 18-20, 2002 and focused on the following:
x Discussion of project objectives and plans with personnel from the International Space Station 
Program Office, Safety and Mission Assurance/Program Risk. 
x Tour of the Mission Evaluation Room, discussions with MER safety console operators, and 
demonstration of computer tools and data sources available to safety console personnel.
x Discussions with a MER Manager focusing on the anomaly resolution process. 
x Attendance at a daily MER tagup meeting.
x Attendance at a Flight Investigation Team (FIT) meeting focusing on overheating of the MCOR data
collection computer.
x Orientation to the PHALCON power systems console in the Multi-Purpose Support Room (MPSR).
x Orientation to the ISS Flight Control Room (FCR) including monitoring of Flight Director 
communications with the ISS crew. 
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x Discussions regarding capabilities of the Galileo fault tree tool and the underlying analysis and 
calculation algorithms.
The second data collection visit occurred on September 5, 2002 and focused on the following:
x Discussion with Safety and Mission Assurance/Program Risk personnel about project objectives and 
progress.
x Discussions with MER safety console personnel and demonstration of available data sources.
x Attendance at a daily MER tagup meeting.
x Detailed discussions with a MER console operator focusing on Galileo functionality, selection of 
corrective actions, and detailed discussion of ongoing carbon dioxide removal assembly (CDRA) 
anomaly.
x Attendance at a Flight Investigation Team meeting focusing on the CDRA anomaly.
x Discussions with a MER manager focusing on the CDRA anomaly in progress and general approach 
for formulating and evaluating corrective actions. 
Review of Experience in Other Industries 
The next phase of the project was the review of experience gained in real-time risk and fault 
management in other comparable domains.  The most relevant experience in using risk models in accident 
and emergency response comes from the commercial nuclear power industry in the United States and 
around the world.  The suitability of this experience to space operations comes from a number of factors, 
but there are two that are essential:
x The nuclear industry is steeped in the use of risk assessment models and methods.  The risk 
assessment perspective, particularly quantitative methods of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, reached 
maturity and universal acceptance in the nuclear industry.  The bulk of applications in the commercial
nuclear industry however have been focused on regulatory considerations rather than real time
operations.
x The nuclear industry has spent twenty-five years since the Three Mile Island accident focusing on 
developing effective methods for accident management, including methods that explicitly use risk 
models to guide decision making, as well as many other approaches.
The NASA space operations community has much to gain by learning from the experience gained in 
the nuclear industry.  The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory has been intimately
involved in both major risk management activities listed above.  In addition, we have performed a series 
of projects for NASA over the past ten years, seeking to adapt risk-based methods from the nuclear 
industry for the specific design and operational needs of commercial aviation, air traffic management, and 
space operations.  A major goal of this project is to apply this experience to identify effective approaches
for real-time risk and fault management in the ISS Mission Evaluation Room.
Experience from other domains such as offshore oil and ongoing research of the NASA Engineering 
for Complex Systems (ECS) program was also reviewed to identify insights applicable to ISS real-time
risk and fault management.
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Review Galileo Fault Tree Tool and Its Application in the Mission 
Evaluation Room 
The Galileo fault tree tool was reviewed to identify its current capabilities to carry out fault isolation 
and failure analysis for ISS operations. This was accomplished through demonstrations in the MER and 
interviews of MER safety console operators. 
Identify Requirements 
Based on the information gathered above, high-level requirements were developed for real-time risk
and fault management in the ISS Mission Evaluation Room.
Develop Recommendations 
The final task was to develop recommendations for providing the remaining functionality for the real-
time tool for fault isolation and failure analysis, and preliminary steps needed to begin the development of 
the Risk Monitor, the integrated risk analysis tool for real-time monitoring.
MISSION EVALUATION ROOM REAL-TIME RISK AND FAULT 
MANAGEMENT
Prescribed Functions for Anomaly Resolution 
The functions of real-time risk and fault management in the MER are focused in the activities of 
Anomaly Resolution Teams (ARTs) and Flight Investigation Teams (FITs), and particularly the role of 
the safety console operator in these processes.  The two types of teams perform essentially the same
anomaly resolution functions:
x Determine the immediate and short-term impacts of the anomaly to ISS systems, hardware, software,
operations, and the on-orbit crew. 
x Identify immediate and short-term corrective actions to resolve and/or mitigate the on-orbit impacts
associated with the anomaly.
x Identify measures for preventing or minimizing recurrence of the anomaly on-orbit. 
x Identify any other actions or controls required to ensure safety and mission assurance.
(Excerpted from On-Orbit Anomaly Resolution Process Work Instruction, MGT-OA-019, May 7, 2002)
The ISS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) MER Console (commonly called the Safety
Console) is represented in the ART/FIT anomaly resolution activities by the ART/FIT Point of Contact 
(POC).  The primary functions performed by the POC in support of anomaly resolution include the 
following:
x Assist the ART/FIT in isolation of the on-orbit anomaly to the correct element, system, hardware, or 
software.
x Identify the required fault-tolerance and determine if the on-orbit anomaly resulted in the loss of a 
level of fault-tolerance.  If so, assess the impacts of the lost level of fault tolerance. 
x Assess ISS and crew safety on a continuous basis.  Identify and concur with any safety-based
constraints or workaround to on-orbit operations.
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x Develop an applicable failure history
x Develop fault trees, as required.
x Identify worst-case effects and associated safety hazards. 
x Develop risk assessment for ART/FIT developed work-around and corrective action option(s). 
(Excerpted from Safety and Mission Assurance/Program Risk Mission Evaluation Room Console
Operations Handbook for the International Space Station Program, SSP 50437 Revision C, August 
2002.)
The functions listed above for the ART/FIT and particularly the MER Safety Console in anomaly
resolution are the primary focus of this study.  Since the functions of the ART and FIT are essentially
similar (the ART is a more rigorous process used for more serious events) discussions of the ART in this 
report will apply (unless otherwise stated) to the FIT as well. 
The basic anomaly resolution functions listed above can be translated into generic task descriptions as 
follows:
1. Catalog the symptoms of the anomaly.
2. Identify immediate and potential future consequences of the anomaly.
3. Assess current defense-in-depth and vulnerabilities to further degradation of defense-in-depth. 
4. If possible, identify the root cause of the anomaly and contributing factors.
5. Identify potential corrective actions and workarounds.
6. Evaluate corrective actions and workarounds based on risk to the vehicle, crew, and mission.
7. Select the most desirable corrective actions and develop procedures for implementation.
8. Monitor implementation of the corrective actions and ensure that they have the desired effects.
These are the basic tasks that are the focus of the recommendations of this report.
It should be noted from the beginning that these tasks are not primarily conducted by individuals but 
rather by teams; that they are not conducted in a short period but rather over a period of days; and that 
they are not conducted in a single location but with involvement of a widely distributed group of experts.
While the primary focus of this study is the personnel of the MER Safety Console, it is also recognized 
that they perform their functions within the broader context of the Anomaly Resolution Team and the 
MER, so that methods and tools recommended in this study should be understandable (and preferably
usable) by other members of the ART and the MER.  In addition, the recommendations formulated
through the use of these methods or tools need to be explained in terms that can be readily understood by 
the MER Manager, Flight Control Teams, the Flight Director, the Mission Management Team, Space 
Station Program Office management, and finally, (and perhaps most importantly) the ISS crew.  Simply
put, the models used and the resulting tools should serve as a “common language” for decision making
and communication among all the affected members of the ISS team.
Observations Regarding the Current Approach to Anomaly Resolution 
in the MER 
As described previously, two formal data collection visits were made to the Johnson Space Center to 
identify and characterize the current approach to anomaly resolution in the MER, focusing on the role of 
the S&MA personnel.
The following are some general observations regarding the current MER anomaly resolution process:
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1. The front end of the anomaly resolution process is very much data-driven, requiring the gathering of 
information from a wide variety of sources, including on-orbit performance data, information on 
previous failure history for comparable systems and components, review of existing fault models,
gathering of hardware design and performance data, identification of available process models, etc. 
2. Discussions focusing on anomaly identification in the FIT meetings we attended seemed to range 
freely among potential causes without a systematic process for narrowing down to a single most
likely cause.  While fault trees were used to guide the discussions, there was a lot of cycling from one 
potential cause to another, and from fault identification to corrective actions and back again. Such
free-wheeling discussions are not entirely bad as they allow for consideration of a broad range of 
ideas.  However, it would be helpful if the discussions followed a systematic process for eliminating
unlikely causes while focusing in on the most likely scenarios.
3. Discussions of the consequences of on-orbit anomalies and possible corrective actions depend on 
input from multiple subsystem engineers for input. This is natural, as the effects of an anomaly will 
be spread across multiple subsystems.  However, there is not a common model that systematically
identifies the consequences across multiple subsystems.
4. Identification and evaluation of possible corrective actions seems to be an ad hoc process, dependent 
on brainstorming among multiple systems experts to identify and evaluate the pros and cons of 
possible strategies.  We did not observe the systematic application of a model-based process to guide 
the evaluation of alternative corrective actions.  In addition, we did not observe a process to ensure 
that the full range of potential strategies is systematically identified. 
5. There is not a systematic method available to evaluate fault tolerance and the consequences of “the
next failure” as required by the MER S&MA Console Operations Handbook. Consequence
evaluations and assessment of the effects of system interdependencies depend on the expertise of 
multiple subsystem engineers. 
6. A method is not available to systematically evaluate the cumulative risk effects of multiple
workarounds.
7.  An approach is not available to exercise and consistently evaluate multiple what-if scenarios for
selecting corrective actions.
Role of the Galileo Fault Tree Tool in the MER 
A software tool called Galileo, under development for NASA by the University of Virginia, is used in 
the MER to support the anomaly resolution process.  It is primarily used to support identification of the
cause of the anomaly.  When an Anomaly Response Team is established, a fault tree is developed and 
used to help identify the range of possible causes for the event.  The fault tree is then discussed during the 
ART meetings to determine which branches represent the most likely cause of the event.  The fault tree 
puts the possible causes for an anomaly in a logical form that allows for guided “pruning” of the tree to 
narrow the investigation to the most likely cause.  Examination of the fault tree can also be helpful in 
identifying additional tests or data collection to provide additional information that can help narrow down 
the diagnosis.
Branches on the Galileo fault trees can be color-coded red, yellow, or green to denote the relative 
likelihood of specific branches, but they cannot currently be evaluated in a dynamic “what-if” sense other 
than to develop separate fault trees to illustrate different scenarios.  The Galileo fault trees can also be 
quantified to help determine the most likely failure paths, but in practical application this is not as helpful 
as it could be because of a shortage of detailed component failure data.
Galileo can currently be used within the MER conference room to develop and evaluate a fault tree 
during an ongoing discussion.  That is, the fault tree can be developed and displayed on the large screen 
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as the discussion proceeds.  However, development cannot currently take place in real time among
multiple distributed locations because of limitations of file structure and networking hardware.
The Galileo tool represents a significant beginning for the effective use of fault trees to support
anomaly identification.  Its primary utility at present is to develop and display fault trees to support 
ART/FIT discussions regarding fault identification. At present Galileo has very limited capabilities to 
guide the fault identification process.  To achieve this potential, necessary first steps include enhancing 
Galileo’s utility to perform what-if analyses and to support fault identification discussions in multiple
locations.  In addition, a high level process for guiding the use of Galileo to focus discussion on the most
likely causes of the anomaly would be very helpful. 
Assessment of the Current Anomaly Resolution Process 
One of the most striking things about anomaly resolution activities in the MER is that decisions and 
analyses are performed without a particular framework to guide the decisions or to assess the 
relationships among diagnoses and selected actions. Risk considerations are not directly tied to an 
underlying model that denotes the relationship of the current event with any others.  Also, there is no 
explicit framework to guide identification of the side effects of the event under consideration. This
requires the expertise of subsystem engineers representing the other systems that could be impacted.
Moreover, complete identification of the side effects requires substantial knowledge of system
interactions and interdependencies.  This knowledge may or may not be possessed by the assembled
group of subsystem engineers.  It would be very helpful if this knowledge of system interdependencies 
could be captured in a logic model so it would be available for consideration in all anomaly resolution
activities.
There are long range plans to tie anomaly resolution into the fault models of the ISS PRA.  However, 
at present the PRAs are conducted for particular increments or snapshots in time, and are focused on a 
few specific top events.  The difficulty of developing the PRA down to the component level for a 
sufficiently broad range of possible top events, and keeping it up to date for all the detailed workarounds 
that occur regularly during day-to-day operations, make it impractical to rely on the PRA as a unifying
framework for anomaly resolution.  In addition, the fault tree structures focus on failures that occur rather 
than on implementation of corrective actions, so the PRA fault models do not naturally align with the 
corrective action portion of anomaly resolution.
Anomaly resolution within the MER would benefit greatly by embedding it within a unifying
framework so that each event could be placed in context with others.  This would also have the benefit of 
providing a unifying language for integrating input from multiple disciplines including engineering, 
operations, safety, and management.
REAL-TIME RISK AND FAULT MANAGEMENT IN OTHER DOMAINS
Commercial Nuclear Power 
Prior to the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979, the prevailing philosophy
was that the human operators only had a small role to play in responding to accidents.  Nuclear power 
plant anomaly operations were organized around response to certain “design base accidents” (DBAs) that 
were used to guide the design and licensing process.  For the most part NPPs were designed so that 
response to DBAs was the responsibility of automated systems such as dropping the control rods 
(“SCRAM”) for reactivity excursions and flooding by the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) in 
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the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).  The operating crew’s primary responsibility was to 
monitor the operation of the automated emergency system, and to intervene only if the emergency system
failed to perform as expected.  Once the effects of the initiating event were controlled by the automated
systems, the operating crew would resume control to place the reactor systems back into the nominal state
so that normal operations could resume.
The accident procedures and operating philosophy of NPPs prior to TMI were event oriented. That
is, anomaly procedures and training were organized around specific events, especially the design basis 
accidents.  The procedures included an “initiating conditions” or “diagnosis” section that informed
operators of the expected symptoms of an event.  Selecting a procedure to use in an accident was a matter
of recognizing the current conditions and matching them to the symptoms of one of the procedures.  Once 
a procedure was selected, operators were required to carry it out exactly as written; no deviations were 
allowed.  If-then rules were built into the procedures to allow for expected contingencies that were pre-
identified.  The goal of anomaly response was to stabilize the plant in a safe state.  Then, recovery
procedures would be implemented to return the plant to its original state so that normal operations could 
resume.  The use of any “workarounds” was strictly controlled within a very narrow range of acceptable
operating conditions defined by the plant’s NRC-approved “Technical Specifications.” 
In the environment described above, “anomaly identification” was performed within very narrow
boundaries.  It was primarily an exercise in matching the current plant state to the symptoms listed in a 
relatively small set of off-normal and emergency procedures.  Because of the requirements for verbatim
compliance with emergency procedures, there was little or no opportunity for improvisation in anomaly
response.
The primary flaw in this system is that events in the real world do not neatly match the pre-defined 
sets that were contained in the NPP off-normal and emergency procedures.  Thus, if an incident occurred 
that did not match the pre-analyzed symptoms, incorrect diagnosis and response was possible.  This is 
exactly what happened at TMI.  The failure of a relief valve at the top of the pressurizer should have been 
treated as a small break loss of coolant accident.  However, the symptoms resulting from this particular 
event made it appear that the pressurizer was overfilled.  To deal with this perceived situation the
operators turned off the emergency core cooling system.  Over a matter of hours the water boiled away
from the fuel rods, the fuel rods overheated and failed, and the bottom of the pressure vessel was nearly
breached due to excessive temperature. Failure of the pressure vessel (which would have led to a much
larger release of radiation to the environment) was only narrowly averted when the crew belatedly 
restarted the emergency cooling systems.
When compared to on-orbit space operations, a major difference of the real-time risk and fault 
management process in the NPP control room is that it is carried out by a relatively small group of people.
For major accidents the control room crew is supported by a small group of experts in the Technical 
Support Center (analogous to the ISS Mission Evaluation Room) and the engineering staff is always on 
call.  However under most conditions the primary responsibility for anomaly resolution abides with the 
control room crew, guided by the off-normal and emergency procedures.
Another significant difference between real-time risk and fault management in a nuclear power plant 
and the ISS MER is the time element. Because a nuclear power plant is basically a dynamic thermal
system, anomalies most often are characterized by changing thermodynamic and reactivity conditions in
the reactor core and heat removal systems. The time available for response by the crew typically ranges 
from minutes to hours.  This is because the thermal systems of a nuclear power plant are very tightly
coupled, and a disruption in one system typically propagates very rapidly to other systems.  By contrast, 
anomalies onboard the ISS most often originate in the performance of a single system, and major effects 
on critical functions such as habitability or mission success are typically not expected to occur for days or 
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weeks, or with the occurrence of an additional component failure. While there are many linkages among
ISS systems (for example, problems that affect attitude control will have consequences in electrical power 
production), there is much less immediate dynamic coupling than in a thermal process like a nuclear
power plant. 
Changes in Nuclear Power Plant Operations Following the Three Mile Island Accident 
The Three Mile Island accident caused significant soul-searching at all levels of the nuclear industry,
and led to fundamental changes in the way NPPs are operated, especially in the assessment of accidents or 
incidents in progress, and the steps taken to identify, implement, and monitor corrective actions.  The 
official inquiry into the TMI accident1 highlighted deficiencies in the prevailing approach to accident
diagnosis and response.  In particular, it highlighted problems in the way information is summarized and 
presented to the crew to facilitate risk management, procedures used to identify and treat accidents and 
incidents, and training of reactor operators to perform risk management as contrasted to normal
operations.
The most significant outcome of the TMI accident was a fundamental paradigm shift in the way
incidents and accidents are evaluated and treated.  Prior to TMI, the emergency response paradigm was 
characterized by event-based diagnosis of the initiating event.  In other words, real-time fault 
management was initiated (and was largely dependent on) an accurate assessment of the event in progress 
in terms of identifying the initiating event or the primary cause leading to the accident.  Thus, effective 
treatment of an anomaly was dependent on correct identification of the initiating event.  As TMI 
demonstrated so effectively, this approach left a significant risk of serious consequences if the event was 
incorrectly diagnosed, or if the symptoms could not be accurately matched to the correct anomaly
response procedure.
Following the TMI accident, the paradigm for accident response in nuclear power plants shifted to a 
focus on controlling the effects of the accident, rather than a primary emphasis on diagnosing the initial 
cause.  While diagnosing and correcting the initiating event may sometimes be the most effective and 
rapid approach to anomaly resolution, this isn’t always the case.  The new paradigm places primary
emphasis on placing the plant in a safe state and controlling and limiting the consequences of the 
initiating event.  (In some ways this is analogous to the use of “workarounds” for anomaly resolution for 
ISS.  However, the tightly coupled dynamics of a nuclear power plant can make the consequences of an 
incorrect choice regarding the choice of a corrective action very serious, as witnessed by the TMI 
accident.)
The two basic approaches to implementing this new paradigm are called “function-oriented” and 
“symptom-based” emergency response. The function-oriented approach is based on the definition of 
several "critical safety functions” that are constantly monitored during normal and off-normal conditions.
When a deviation in the health of one of the critical safety functions is detected, the goal is to 
systematically evaluated the availability of a set of pre-identified “success paths” that could be
implemented to address the critical function challenges.  Following the TMI accident the plants belonging 
to the Combustion Engineering Owner’s Group implemented function-oriented emergency procedure
guidelines using “resource assessment trees” to identify the critical safety functions, the parameters used 
to monitor their health, and possible success paths to be used in the event of a critical function challenge.
The Westinghouse Owner’s Group implemented another approach to function-based emergency
procedures.  Logic trees called “critical safety function status trees” (CSFSTs) were used to monitor key
parameters for the critical safety functions.  Based on the combinations of those key parameters, safety
function status was rated according to its relative seriousness as “green,” “yellow,” or “red.”  Operators 
were guided to specific procedures for dealing with the critical function challenges based on the specific 
combination of parameters at a given point in time.
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The symptom-based approach means that assessment of status and identification of corrective actions
are explicitly based upon current symptoms observed in the plant. Rather than having simply a list of 
symptoms at the front of the procedure for fault diagnosis purposes, this approach includes an explicit
algorithm for evaluating plant state and selecting corrective actions.  The symptom-based approach could 
be used as the front end for either event-based or function-based approaches for anomaly resolution.  That 
is, the symptom based logic structure could either be used to guide event identification or assessment of 
critical function status.  Then, procedures could be selected either to correct the initiating event or to 
control critical function challenges.
The Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Owner’s group was the primary advocate of the symptom-based
approach to anomaly resolution.  Three Mile Island was a B&W plant, and one of the major errors of the 
TMI operators was the failure to correlate reactor temperature and pressure, which would have quickly
provided evidence that the water in the reactor vessel was steam rather than liquid.  For this reason the 
B&W emergency procedures following TMI used a symptom-based approach with a primary focus on the 
pressure-temperature correlation.  A set of IF-THEN rules was used in conjunction with this correlation to 
assess the thermal conditions within the reactor vessel and to select corrective actions accordingly.
Tools for Real-Time Risk and Fault Management in the Nuclear Industry
Following the TMI accident there was a surge of activity focused on the development of tools to 
support real-time risk and fault management in nuclear power plant control rooms.  The Kemeny
Commission report had recognized the critical need to provide useful information to reactor operators 
during off-normal conditions and accidents, and research institutes around the world began to develop
prototype systems.  There was a great sense of optimism that computer technology, including advanced
methods from Artificial Intelligence (AI), would provide an effective solution for the challenges 
presented by problem-solving in time critical, highly stressful emergency conditions. 
A wide range of institutions from around the world began developing possible computer solutions to 
the problems highlighted by TMI.  In the United States the primary activity was focused at the reactor 
vendors (Westinghouse, Babcock and Wilcox, Combustion Engineering, and General Electric), the 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories
(including INEEL), and universities such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Georgia 
Institute of Technology, and the University of Tennessee.  In parallel, the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission started a major research program focused on identifying and resolving regulatory 
issues regarding the implementation of computer technology in nuclear power plant control rooms.  In the 
early 1980’s the NRC’s research program focused on the evaluation of specific concepts for computer
support in the control room, as well as the back-room Technical Support Centers that were mandated for 
U.S. nuclear facilities.  In the mid-and late 1980’s and beyond the NRC’s research shifted to more generic 
issues such as human reliability analysis, risk impacts of digital technology, and risk informed regulation 
of nuclear power plants.  Many of these programs continue in one form or another to the present day,
providing a rich base of information regarding real-time risk and fault management in U.S. nuclear power 
plants.  However, because the NRC is a regulatory agency without a responsibility for operations or 
mission success, much of the work focuses on risk assessment and regulation rather than operational risk 
management.  As a result, the NRC’s focus is very much focus on quantitative Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment rather than the qualitative risk management methods that are more appropriate for operational
risk management, where detailed risk models and quantitative failure data may not be adequate for real-
time application.
Other countries around the world with major commercial nuclear programs also aggressively
researched potential applications of computer technology to nuclear power plant operations in the wake of 
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the TMI accident.  Because of differing regulatory approaches, plant designs, and operating philosophies,
the systems developed in different countries often took very different approaches to the same generic 
problems.  Some of the more prominent research efforts were conducted in France, Germany, and Japan.
In addition, the OECD Halden Reactor Project in Norway conducts a focused research program on behalf 
of 20 member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  Because many
of these countries have less conservative regulatory approaches than the United States, they have been 
more aggressive in moving computer technology from the laboratory in the control room for real-time
risk and fault management functions. 
Computer-based tools have been developed and tested in the nuclear industry for all phases of 
anomaly response.  For example, early fault detection systems2 based on comparison of plant parameters
to computer simulation models have been used to detect impending anomalies before standard alarm
systems are tripped.  Rule-based expert systems3 have been developed that use combinations of plant 
parameters to assist fault diagnosis.  Critical function-based methods4 have been used to help identify
potential corrective actions and to formulate procedures based on the availability of success paths during 
the evolution of an event. Computer-based procedure systems5 have been developed to assist in the 
implementation of corrective actions during accident conditions.  Finally, integrated toolsets6 have been
developed combining many of the above capabilities to provide the full range of risk and fault 
management functions for anomaly resolution. 
These representative systems are only a small sample of the tools that have been proposed to support
real-time risk and fault management in nuclear power plants.  There is a wealth of literature describing the 
experienced gained in development and testing of these systems that can be used to provide insights in the 
development of analogous systems for space operations. For example, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has issued a series of reports7-11 summarizing experience gained and design guidance for 
computer-based systems to support reactor operations.  The International Atomic Energy Agency has 
published a report12 summarizing experience gained worldwide in developing and implementing
computerized support systems for nuclear power plants.  Finally, the OECD Halden Reactor Project has 
published a historical overview13 of the research conducted over the past 30 years on behalf of the 
member nations of the Halden Project. These documents provide numerous references to papers and 
reports providing details on dozens of systems that have been tested in the international nuclear 
community.
Offshore Oil 
The approach to risk management used in the offshore oil and gas industry has been greatly
influenced by the fire and explosion that occurred on the Piper Alpha platform in the North Sea on July 6, 
1988.  In part because the platform was laid out so that the living quarters were inaccessible to rescuers, 
167 lives were lost.  The resulting investigation and recommendations had a great influence on the risk 
management and regulation of offshore facilities, particularly in the U.K. and the North Sea 14.  For the 
most part, risk management has been implemented from the perspectives of design and regulation, rather 
than focusing on real-time anomaly response. 
The Piper Alpha accident was a watershed incident for the offshore oil and gas industry in the same 
fashion that Three Mile Island led to fundamental changes for the worldwide nuclear industry. Piper
Alpha brought home the lesson that compliance with static safety regulations is not always adequate, but 
rather that regulators, designers, and operators of high risk facilities need to pay attention to the processes 
by which systems are designed and work is planned and carried out.  Piper Alpha had different effects on 
industry practices in the U.K. and U.S., in part due to the different proximity to the event and degree of 
public awareness in the two countries.
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Regarding the UK, the Piper Alpha inquiry recommended the development of a Safety Case program
supervised by a government ministry to demonstrate and oversee the safety of offshore facilities.  Each 
facility would be required to develop a comprehensive safety case to demonstrate that an adequate safety
management system was in place for the facility, that major hazards and risks had been identified, and 
that personnel could be evacuated in an emergency.  The Safety Case approach has resulted in the 
introduction of formal risk assessment methods into the U.K. offshore industry.
In contrast to the U.K. Safety Case approach, the U.S. offshore oil and gas industry is testing the 
suitability of voluntary practices for controlling the safety of offshore installations.  The U.S. Minerals 
Management Service (MMS), the government agency responsible for regulation of offshore facilities, 
recommended in 1991 that all facilities should develop a Safety and Environmental Management Program
(SEMP).   The philosophy of the SEMP is that management of hazards should be an integral part of the 
design, construction, maintenance, and operation of offshore facilities.
For the most part, risk and fault management in the offshore oil industry has been treated primarily by
pre-analyzing accident states using qualitative or quantitative risk assessment methods, and then
incorporating the resulting insights in operating guidance and procedures. 
More recently however, increased attention is being given to the issues of automation or advanced
computer-based operator support systems for real-time risk and fault management for offshore facilities.
Many large operators, especially those in the Norwegian North Sea, are beginning to implement digital 
technology in the control rooms of production platforms. This will require that significant attention be
given to human roles in the use of advanced computer-based risk and fault management systems.
NASA Engineering for Complex Systems Program 
The NASA Engineering for Complex Systems (ECS) program is engaged in the development of tools 
to support management of risk in the design and operation of space and aeronautics systems.  Some of the 
projects being conducted under the ECS program could potentially provide capabilities that can be 
adapted for real-time risk and fault management in the ISS Mission Evaluation Room.  For example, the 
Mishap Initiator Identification System is being developed to provide more consistency in mishap
reporting, and to provide greater depth in anomaly and failure analysis.  Rather than focusing on only the 
failure at hand, the tool will help provide increased understanding resulting from comparison across 
multiple events, and more systemic understanding of the causes of failures.  This tool is primarily an off-
line tool to provide a searchable repository of NASA mishap reports, which then could be used to guide 
inquiry in the assessment of a new mishap, or to support the development of generic lessons learned 
across multiple events.
The Investigation Organizer is a set of tools to support mishap and anomaly investigation, and is
based on the existing Science Organizer web-based collaborative infrastructure.  The inquiry is guided by 
incorporation of models of mishap event chains, and the Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) 
structure is used to organize information about potential contributing factors for an incident.  The system
helps gather information that can either support or refute a particular hypothesis regarding the cause of the 
event.  Once again, this is primarily an off-line tool, best suited for post-mortem analysis of a failed 
mission such as the failure of a planetary probe. 
The Model-Based Hazard Analysis project is developing tools to identify potential hazardous states 
during the design process, so that such hazards can be eliminated or controlled through design
modifications.  The tools will depend on both heuristic (relying on analyst’s knowledge and experience) 
13
and model-based (relying on formal system representations and analysis methods) for identifying and 
mitigating potential hazards during design.  The model-based approach will utilize dynamic event trees to 
explore potential combinations of hardware states, human actions, and physical variables to explore the 
relative probability of possible hazardous end states. 
The SimStation project is working to develop an integrated, quick-look model of ISS behavior to 
assist the VIPeR (Vehicle Integration Performance) team in performing what-if analyses.  The primary
focus of the VIPeR team is long-term management, planning, and operation of ISS systems.  SimStation
will include a high-resolution functional model based on reliability block diagrams in which faults can be 
inserted to explore consequences.  It will also have a first-order model of ISS behavior, and an integrated
redundancy and risk model.  Expected benefits of SimStation include the more rapid consideration of 
alternative corrective actions, providing focused direction to subsystem teams performing high fidelity
analysis, and broader understanding of system trades across subsystem teams, especially under off-
nominal conditions.
Activities focused on real-time fault and risk management for the ISS Mission Evaluation Room
should include assessment of the capabilities and tools developed by the Engineering for Complex
Systems program, to ensure that maximum benefit is realized from the investment of ECS. 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SOFTWARE SUPPORT FOR REAL-TIME
RISK AND FAULT MANAGEMENT IN THE MISSION EVALUATION
ROOM
The following requirements should be addressed when developing software tools for anomaly
resolution, based on our evaluation of MER anomaly resolution processes:
1. It is very important that risk tools utilized in the MER be accepted by the ISS Sustaining Engineering 
organization, and integrated with operations in the Flight Control Room.  That is, the tools used for 
anomaly resolution must perform analyses and convey recommendations in ways that interface 
naturally with the engineering and operations functions.
2. Risk and fault management tools must be able to account for constantly evolving systems due to ISS 
increment construction and the cumulative effects of workarounds.
3. Initial implementation of risk and fault management tools should focus on qualitative aspects of 
anomaly resolution.  Quantification should be introduced gradually and carefully supported with
credible data to ensure acceptance by engineering and operations personnel.
4. Risk and fault management tools should be capable of clearly representing system interrelationships
and the consequences of “the next failure.”
5. Risk and fault management tools should be capable of evaluating suggested corrective actions 
according to relevant parameters such as risk, effects on other systems, ease of implementation, etc. 
6. A logic framework focusing on mission success (rather than failure) should be included to 
systematically assess effects of failures on mission success, and to identify and evaluate potential 
corrective actions.
7. The impact on the crew should be considered when evaluating potential corrective actions.  For 
example, corrective actions should be evaluated with regards to time required for implementation,
potential safety hazards, etc. 
8. Tools for anomaly resolution should be embedded within procedures or higher level tools for guiding
the overall process, e.g. to guide fault tree development, identify issues, focus discussion, and identify
impacts on other systems.
9. One of the potential benefits for risk and fault management tools is to reduce the number of people 
required for real-time risk and fault management. However, measures should be taken to ensure that 
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all relevant information and perspectives are still included in the anomaly resolution process.  A 
model focused on mission success could be used to ensure that all relevant issues are addressed.
10. The "workaround" paradigm for anomaly resolution will require a flexible data structure to allow 
ongoing analyses to be effectively plugged into the risk and fault management toolset.  Configuration
management will be a major concern to ensure that models always represent the current configuration 
of the system.  Finely detailed workarounds that are performed within the confines of a single Orbital 
Replacement Unit (ORU) may be very difficult to adequately model, both individually and to reflect 
the effects of multiple workarounds. 
11. Training will be required to ensure that risk and fault management tools are used accurately and 
effectively.
12. When possible, multiple paths of inquiry should be used to avoid potential incorrect diagnoses of 
initiating events.  Experience from past events should be used to help determine whether the 
assessment is credible.  Alternative methods of analysis, such as using both fault- and success-based
approaches in parallel, can provide safeguards against incorrect diagnosis and selection of corrective
actions.  The tools should guide the collection of additional information that can confirm or 
disconfirm possible diagnoses.
13. Process models should be integrated with the logical processes, especially to support identification of 
tests that can confirm/disconfirm diagnoses. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The following recommendations describe a plan for utilizing computer-based support for MER
anomaly resolution.  They include near-term recommendations to develop the Phase 2 structured 
approach and common toolset for anomaly resolution, and long-term recommendations for the Phase 3 
integrated Risk Monitor. 
Near-Term Recommendations
Phase 2A – Fault Identification and MER Process Changes 
1. Galileo updates 
x Develop a diagnostic tool to guide and focus fault tree analysis for fault identification and discussion.
The tool should assist in “pruning” the tree to focus on the most likely cause of the event, and to 
identify tests that can gather additional information if required for further pruning.
x Develop a dynamic analysis capability to manage multiple “what-if” cases to explore multiple
possible diagnoses of the fault. 
x Develop a distributed system to allow development and evaluation of Galileo fault tree models in 
remote locations.
x Archive fault trees, make them accessible for future use, and integrate them into the common risk 
and/or mission success framework.  Master Logic Diagrams within Galileo could serve as a "meta-
controller" to access and link together the fault trees for a particular analysis.
x Work with users to develop good user interfaces to enhance acceptance and usability.
2. MER process changes for anomaly resolution 
x Develop a common success-oriented framework to show functional relationships, system
relationships, and their contribution to mission success.  This framework will serve as a common
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language for communication across multiple disciplines, layers of management, and with the ISS
crew.
x Identify the process changes and the software architecture required to maximize safety console 
effectiveness in MER anomaly resolution. 
x Identify suitability of existing risk models (PRAs, reliability block diagrams, Failure Mode and Effect 
Analyses, etc.) for incorporating into the anomaly resolution process.
x Investigate and develop the detailed schema for expert software support for anomaly resolution. 
Phase 2B – Tools for Integrated Analysis
Develop methods and prototype software tools to support anomaly resolution including the following
functionality:
x Systematically assess the immediate and future (dynamic) consequences of an anomaly and possible
additional failures, and to manage multiple “what-if” scenarios.
x Model and clearly illuminate the dependencies of components and systems on the “utility” support 
systems – power, thermal control, and data. 
x Prioritize diagnostic tests to assist event identification, based on considerations of success likelihood, 
cost, and time.
x Guide the development and evaluation of alternative corrective actions.  The identification of near-
term corrective actions will be based on the "success path" concept from critical function analysis.
x Formulate rules for selection of corrective actions or workarounds based on the specific 
circumstances of the anomaly in progress. Once viable corrective actions are identified, they need to 
be systematically evaluated against the relevant criteria.  The method should explicitly compare the 
desirability of corrective actions for the original event with potential workarounds.
x Evaluate the risk of cumulative effects of workarounds.  This will require the assessment of risk in the 
context of what has happened previously, rather than relative to a static PRA model.
x Integrate fault and consequence models with simulation models of components and systems.
x Incorporate and evaluate crew requirements for implementing alternative corrective actions, and 
impacts on other crew tasks.
The basic approach for building on the Galileo fault isolation and failure analysis capability will be to 
develop a critical function-oriented Mission Success Framework.  It will start with high level ISS 
program critical functions/goals, and work down to systems at the resource level.  Methods for
identification of alternative corrective actions using the new mission success models will be developed 
and incorporate information contained in fault trees, Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs), 
reliability block diagrams, etc.  The framework can then be used as a tool to do consequence analysis,
"next failure" analysis, and to identify potential corrective actions (to confirm diagnosis and to generate 
workarounds).
The enhanced Galileo tool will be used to generate fault trees for fault identification and then plug
them into the functional model for assessment of consequences and identification of corrective actions.
The functional models will be extended for the specific event in progress to identify information
requirements for further diagnosis and to identify alternative resource options and success paths for 
workarounds.  Mission-success based guidelines (risk, effectiveness, crew requirements, impacts on other 
critical functions, etc.) will be developed for selecting corrective actions.
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The critical function models and fault trees will be continually “bootstrapped” to add details and
follow increment buildups and workarounds.  Guidelines will be established for "configuration
management" to ensure that models are kept up to date for long-term use. 
The Phase 2A and 2B methods and tools will be developed so that they can be applied to the space
shuttle as well as the International Space Station. 
Long-Term Recommendations
Phase 3A – Automated and integrated risk tools 
x Develop a full-featured tool for fault isolation and corrective action selection, integrating both the 
failure oriented Galileo tool and the mission success tools developed in Phase 2.  The ability to 
perform and manage multiple “what-if” scenarios will be included. 
x Develop a formal “risk monitor” tool to assess risk impact of maintenance and logistics activities. 
Phase 3B – Combine all the tools into a fully-integrated Mission Success Framework
All the tools developed previously will be tested in the operational environment and combined into a 
fully-integrated toolset for anomaly resolution.  The following paragraphs describe the overall vision for 
the integrated Mission Success Framework.
We believe that the most effective framework for performing anomaly resolution within the MER is 
one that focuses on mission success.  This is because mission success defines the goals of the entire space 
station program, helps prioritize the significance of any off-normal events, and can be used to take all 
considerations into account when evaluating potential corrective actions. 
We believe that a Mission Success Framework patterned after the critical function approach utilized 
in the commercial nuclear power industry will serve as an effective guide for anomaly resolution in the
ISS Mission Evaluation Room.  This Mission Success Framework will form the foundation of the 
integrated Risk Monitor for real-time anomaly resolution in the MER. 
The initial development of the Mission Success Framework should focus on the hardware systems
that are used to provide the mission success critical functions.  At a later stage of development broader
critical functions could be added, to address programmatic issues, international partner considerations,
etc.
CONCEPTUAL FEATURES OF THE MISSION SUCCESS FRAMEWORK
Functional modeling
Functional modeling methods were developed and implemented following the Three Mile Island to 
provide an alternative perspective for real-time fault and risk management in commercial nuclear power 
plants.  The type of functional models most suited for real-time risk and fault management are success-
oriented logic structures that show how plant resources can be configured in multiple ways to provide 
critical functions in normal, off-normal, and emergency conditions.  During the late 1970’s INEEL
implemented a functional modeling approach called response trees that were implemented in the 
emergency procedures of the Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) reactor15.  The response trees were used to guide 
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reactor operators in evaluating critical functions during an accident, and for selecting success paths for 
restoring critical functions that were challenged by the event and its consequences. 
Following the TMI accident, Bill Corcoran of Combustion Engineering developed the foundational 
principles of critical safety functions and how they could be used to support accident and emergency
management in nuclear power plants16. Mohammed Modarres of the University of Maryland has
developed methods17 such as goal tree/success trees (GTSTs) and master plant logic diagrams (MPLDs)
to model critical functions for complex systems.  He has also organized an international community of
researchers to explore possible applications of functional models in the nuclear industry and other
domains.  This group has sponsored six international workshops aimed at stimulating further development
and application of these methods.
At INEEL we have developed a general structure for functional models that can be adapted and 
implemented in many different ways depending on the intended application.  Figure 1 shows the general 




















Figure 1. General structure for functional models.
As the figure shows, the functional model organizes information about the structure of a system into 
five different categories represented by the different levels of the tree: 
x Mission – The overall purpose or overarching goal for the system.  For a nuclear power plant the
mission could be defined as “produce electrical power efficiently, economically, and safely.”  For the 
ISS the mission might be described as “provide a habitable platform for supporting on-orbit scientific
research.”
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x Critical functions – Those functions that must be performed or maintained at all times in order to 
carry out the mission of the system.  For risk and fault management in a nuclear power plant these are 
usually the plant’s critical safety functions – core cooling, reactivity control, heat removal, and 
containment of radioactive materials.
x Tasks – Those tasks that must be performed to maintain the critical safety functions.  In this context 
the word task is used generically.  That is, a task may be performed by human action, automatically or 
passively through plant hardware, by software control, or any combination of human, hardware, and 
software.
x Resources – The resources are the hardware, software, procedures, and other resources that can be 
configured to perform and maintain the critical functions. 
x Support systems – The support systems are those utilities that are required for the resources to
operate.  Example resources in a nuclear power plant are electrical power, component cooling 
systems, and data systems.  A primary feature of support systems is that they provide the support 
functions to many components, so that their failure can disable numerous components.  In nuclear
power plants and space vehicles this vulnerability to “common cause failure” is typically addressed 
by provide multiple redundant support systems supplying the function to independent “trains” of 
components that can be used to provide the same critical function. 
The arrangement of the components on the functional model shows the different ways that the 
resources can be configured to provide and maintain the critical functions.  Each of the configurations that 
will provide a critical function is referred to as a success path for that critical function. 
When an event or anomaly occurs, the functional model can be used to evaluate, based on the
available systems and components, which success paths can be used to restore a critical function that has 
been lost, or to maintain a critical function that has been degraded or challenged.  It can also be used to 
explore different strategies for restoring an unavailable critical function – e.g. whether to correct the cause 
by repairing or replacing failed components, or to bypass the failed components by utilizing an alternate 
success path.  The latter case is widely used for anomaly response on the ISS, and is referred to as a 
workaround. Repairing a failed component can be accomplished in some cases when ground personnel
can devise a repair procedure.  Replacing a failed component most often requires that a replacement be 
manifested on a future shuttle mission, so it is usually not a near term option for restoring a challenged 
critical function onboard the ISS. 
Functional models are also very useful for illustrating the effects of failed equipment, and to identify
and evaluate possible corrective actions.  The logic structure makes it easy to show what side effects the 
failure of any combination of components and systems will have, and what success paths will be disabled 
by the initial failures and their side effects.  This is particularly helpful in understanding the consequences 
of a support system failure.  By examining the model to identify the success paths that remain available 
following a set of failures and consequences, it is possible to evaluate and select the best course of action 
to follow.  Basic rules can be established in advance to help guide the selection of alternative success
paths for implementation.  These rules can then be augmented by specific considerations for the particular 
situation in progress to complete the selection process. 
Figures 2-6 show preliminary high-level functional models for the International Space Station.
Models are shown for ISS habitability and for the electrical power and thermal control support systems.
These models are for demonstration purposes only.  A rigorous process including review by ISS 


















































































































































































































































































































Figure 6. Functional Model for the International Space Station (cont.). 
Application of the Mission Success Framework in the Mission 
Evaluation Room
The Mission Success Framework will be used to guide real-time risk and fault management in the ISS 
Mission Evaluation Room.  This framework will be a functional model describing in logical and graphical 
form how space station tasks, resources, and support systems work together to provide the critical 
functions necessary for mission success.  The particular form of the functional model forming the 
foundation of the Mission Success Framework should be chosen to suit the specific operational 
requirements for the space station program.  Usability and understandability of the models for 
communication and decision making purposes should be the primary criteria for selecting the specific 
format to be used.  Similarly, the software used to implement and exercise the Mission Success 
Framework should be selected based on the operational requirements of the MER, effective 
communication with the MPSR and FCR, and usability by all involved program personnel.  It is possible 
that a commercial software package for developing and manipulating functional models could be adapted 
for the space station program.  However, at the base functional models are simple Boolean structures, so it 
may be more efficient to adapt a general purpose risk analysis program such as Galileo or SAPHIRE to 
manipulate success trees as well as fault trees.  Or, it might be most cost-effective to develop a software 
module specifically to handle the Mission Success Framework, which could then be interfaced with the 
fault tree package by a higher-level “meta-analysis” program.
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Important considerations for the Mission Success Framework 
Combining Success and Failure Models 
The Mission Success Framework should be combined with the enhanced Galileo tool to provide a
complete package for event identification, assessment of consequences, and identification and selection of
alternative corrective actions.  Conceptually, the fault trees will plug into the resource or support system
levels of the functional model, illustrating the potential causes of a resource or support system failure.  At 
this interface the fault and success models will be combined.  Looking up the tree structure will provide 
guidance on consequence evaluation and corrective action selection, while looking down the tree to the 
fault tree model will provide guidance for event identification.  Once a fault tree has been developed and
validated it can be stored for future use in anomaly resolution for events involving failure of the same 
components or systems. The fault trees can be stored in a separate database and then plugged into the
functional model in a modular fashion when specific events occur involving failure of the modeled
component or support system.  A meta-level analysis tool can be developed to guide use of the total
fault/success package for performing all the major tasks of anomaly resolution.
To Quantify or Not 
A very important question about the use of any kind of risk models in real-time risk and fault 
management is whether or not quantitative estimates of success or failure should be used.  The first 
priority is to make sure that the logic models and procedures for using them are accurate in helping 
identifying event causes and corrective actions.  The real goal is to identify the actual cause of the event 
in question, and to choose an effective corrective action.  Quantification comes into play in selecting 
between two possible event diagnoses, or evaluating the likelihood of adverse effects when two different 
corrective actions are under consideration.  Quantified probability estimates should be used with great 
caution.  Currently available estimates of failure probability are not adequate for purposes of fault and 
risk management in real time situations.  They can be effectively used for longer-term considerations of 
recurrence control and evaluation of options for returning ISS systems to their design state.  For real time
evaluations, the highest priority is to ensure that the models that guide decision making and the
procedures for using them are as accurate as possible given the current understanding of risk management
and vehicle configuration.
Developing the Mission Success Framework
The Mission Success Framework should be developed with participation from all stakeholders 
including engineering, operations, S&MA, MER managers, ISS program management, and the crew 
office.  The foundation of the Mission Success Framework should be developed from existing
information including system descriptions and risk models.  One of the most important steps is for all 
parties to agree on the definition of the top level mission and the critical functions required to carry out
the mission.  Then the tasks and resources that are available for performing the critical functions will be 
modeled, and the interdependencies between systems and critical functions.  Next, the support system
dependencies are detailed, and detailed component and system details are added. 
The preliminary version of the Mission Success Framework should focus on the technical systems only.
It should be tested through analytical exercises and then in training exercises.  Once the technical version 
has been validated and implemented for anomaly resolution, development of the programmatic critical 
functions can be initiated.
23
Components of the Mission Success Framework 
The primary visible component of the Mission Success Framework is the functional model organized 
into the mission, task, resources, and support system hierarchy described above.  At the component level 
fault trees for component failures are linked in, providing the capability to identify causes for component
failures and other anomalies.  However, the Mission Success Framework is supplemented by direct links 
(in tabular form or software structures) to the following information:
1. Detailed information about components and systems – operating limits, performance characteristics, 
process models, failure modes, etc.
2. Models of support system dependencies and component failure states resulting from failure of the 
support systems.
3. Instrumentation available for monitoring the health of the critical functions, determining the 
availability of success paths, monitoring the performance of success paths, and monitoring the status 
of components.
4. A set of static or dynamic rules for selecting success paths for implementation in response to an 
anomaly.  Static selection rules are not dependent on system status and thus are the easiest to 
establish.  Dynamic selection rules change according to system status and thus are much more
complex to develop.
Procedure for use of the Mission Success Framework for Anomaly
Resolution in the MER 
The following is a generic procedure for use of the Mission Success Framework in the ISS Mission
Evaluation Room.
1. Collect indications and symptoms of the anomaly, and previous data showing the precursors of the 
anomaly.
2. Identify components that have failed as a result of the anomaly.
3. Use the functional model to identify side effects of the failures, challenges to the critical functions, 
vulnerabilities to additional failures, and effects on success paths for the challenged critical functions. 
4. Select and implement alternative success path(s) if required for near-term restoration of the 
challenged critical functions. 
5. Perform a “quick-look” analysis to evaluate the tradeoffs between the extended use of alternative 
success paths versus detailed diagnosis for repair/replacement of failed components.
6. Develop a fault tree for the identified failures based on system design information and previous 
failure history. 
7. Identify and assess the relative likelihood of different failure paths based on currently available 
information.
8. Identify additional tests that could generate additional information if needed to conclusively identify
the failure path that caused the anomaly.
9. Use the functional model to evaluate the relative desirability (in terms of risks and effects on other 
critical functions) of alternative success paths, include options to repair/replace failed components, or 
workarounds based on implementation of alternative success paths.
10. Select the desired success path(s) for implementation.
11. Develop detailed procedures for implementing the selected success path(s).
12. Identify indicators and measurements that can be used to verify effectiveness of the selected success
path(s).
13. Implement the selected success path(s) and monitor for effectiveness.
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Benefits of the Mission Success Framework for Real-Time Risk and 
Fault Management in the Mission Evaluation Room 
The following are some of the expected benefits from using the Mission Success Framework to 
support anomaly resolution in the Mission Evaluation Room:
1. The Mission Success Framework can serve as the foundation for group decisions in real-time risk and 
fault management.  The framework will provide the common discussion focus for the anomaly
resolution activities performed by individuals from many disciplines working together as a team,
including the MER manager, subsystem engineers, and the S&MA POC.
2. One of the primary benefits of the Mission Success Framework is the capability to organize the 
information for anomaly resolution within a common framework directly tied to mission success.
This helps to ensure that different disciplines and groups within the anomaly resolution process can 
consider the information in a consistent manner, and evaluate the implication of anomaly resolution 
decisions across disciplinary boundaries.
3. The Mission Success Framework allows individual pieces of information to be systematically related 
to the implications for mission success. 
4. The Mission Success Framework provides a powerful tool for modeling system interdependencies, 
and the implication of those interdependencies on any number of real or hypothetical anomaly
scenarios.
5. The Mission Success Framework can be combined with a systematic information requirements
analysis to help identify additional tests that can be made to isolate the root cause of an anomaly.  In 
addition, it is possible to systematically evaluate the information required to: 
x Evaluate the health of the critical function in question.
x Evaluate the availability of alternative success paths.
x Evaluate the most desirable success paths for implementation.
x Implement the chosen success path. 
x Monitor the performance of the success path in maintaining or restoring the critical function. 
6. The Mission Success Framework serves as a fundamental “map” of the problem solving space for 
anomaly resolution.  Once the structure of the functional model and rules for selecting success path 
are established, the framework serves as an unbiased guide for systematic anomaly resolution. All
anomaly resolution decisions can then be made in an unbiased way with mission success as the
primary driver.
7. The function-oriented Mission Success Framework explicitly compensates for the fact that not all 
possible scenarios can be pre-analyzed and planned for.  It provides a mission-focused means to 
derive corrective actions for the full range of events and combinations of events that challenge the 
mission-significant critical functions.
8. The Mission Success Framework provides a means to incorporate information from multiple
disciplines and place it within a common framework for evaluation.  In this way all disciplines and 
opinions can be represented and systematically considered in light of mission success.
9. Any number of “what-if” scenarios can be evaluated using the Mission Success Framework and 
directly compared with other alternative scenarios.
10. The Mission Success Framework provides a natural means to integrate both success- and failure-
oriented risk models with physical or virtual models of the system, such as those being developed
within the SimStation project of the NASA Engineering for Complex Systems program.
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LONG-TERM VISION FOR INTEGRATED RISK TOOLS FOR THE ISS 
PROGRAM
The difficulty of envisioning an integrated tool for use by the overall ISS program is that it will have
multiple objectives and be used by individuals or teams with varying skills.  Therefore, a long-term vision 
for an integrated tool to be used by the ISS program should follow the R3 (Risk Assessment, Risk
Management, and Risk Communication) concept.  The R3 concept represents the evaluation of risk, the 
decisions associated with this information, and the clear dissemination of the evaluation and decisions to 
appropriate entities.  This concept follows, in theory, the natural progression of a problem to its solution 
and incorporates the ability to involve multiple individuals.  Figure 2 shows an overview of the R3
concept.








The following paragraphs discuss the specific characteristics and supporting technologies of a tool 
that contains these concepts.  Some of these technologies are available while others are in development or 
need to be planned to support a long-term goal for a NASA tool that can be used in operations.
Risk Assessment 
The evaluation of risk is strictly designed to be an unbiased view of potential vulnerabilities and
weaknesses in a system.  Evaluation includes a baseline risk that establishes system concerns in a new or 
pristine state and relative risk to the system as it undergoes changes due to normal wear and use.
Evaluation techniques should include associated hardware, software, and human interactions.  Inter- and 
intra-dependencies should be modeled in failure space with the option of converting to success space. 
Evaluation of risks should be performed in a qualitative and quantitative manner.  They should
include static and dynamic modeling methods. A flexible tool is needed to evaluate risks for functions, 
systems, subsystems, and components.  Additionally, user-defined endstates can be created to combine
members at the same level of this hierarchy for evaluation. 
The ISS program incorporates a modular approach and therefore demands a flexible risk assessment
tool interface.  As modules are added to the ISS, the risk assessment is modified by definition.  In 
addition, the existing risk assessment also undergoes modification over time as systems are changed to 
accomplish ISS required functions.  This tool would need to accommodate new modules and join them to
the modified portion of the ISS.
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New risk assessment tools and new versions of current risk assessment tools will be developed in the
future.  The integrated tool must be able to import and export information to these new versions.  This 
infers that a standard method of converting models into a more universal tool must be available.
Risk Management
Risk management is the process of weighing risk analysis results with other considerations to 
determine the best manner of reducing significant risks to an acceptable level.  The management of risks 
is a decision making process that encompasses information gathered from the risk analysis including 
functional impacts, magnitude of risks, and uncertainty of results. Probably the most important aspect of 
risk management is the ability to direct “what if” questions for analytical resolution that weigh different 
solutions and their impact on system and functional success.  This is often referred to as the risk-informed
decision making process.  Separation from the analytical process maintains unbiased analyses and allows 
for other considerations (e.g., public opinion, and political sensitivities) to be included in any 
controversial decisions. 
The integrated tool will have to be able to support some automatic risk management information.
Namely, based on the understanding of the risks on a function, system, subsystem, component level, or 
endstate level, the software will have to be aware when risks in these areas is above a determine area or is 
trending upwards toward an unacceptable risk level.  The risk levels will be user-defined and can be set at 
different quantitative and qualitative levels.  This information should be time based and be displayed for a 
variety of user-determined time frames. Uncertainty should be displayed in any projection of risk, such 
that it is clearly understood what the most likely and upper and lower bounds of the associated risks are to 
enhance management decision.
Understanding the associated risks for the current situation or a postulated scenario projects most of 
the immediate information to risk managers.  However, as systems are modified the dynamics of a risk 
model may change causing less important components to suddenly become essential to a function, 
system, or endstate.  Viewing the risks along with the important components provides a more complete
view for managerial risk-informed decisions. 
Risk Communication 
Risk communication, in a traditional sense, encompasses risk analysis and management areas.  The 
ability to quickly communicate results in a meaningful manner is important in both of these areas.
Although displays for risk management and analysis need to be clear and communicate information to 
multiple individuals well, this is not the emphasis of this section.  NASA and the ISS program have a
unique situation that requires the ability to communicate risk analyses and the management of these risks 
to a set of interdisciplinary team members.  This must be done quickly and minimize divergent and 
unfocused concepts.  A tool that can quickly get to the root or close to the root of a problem will be 
valuable in the MER.  This tool must also support communicating this information to individuals and 
directing conversations on the best solution for problems.  We recommend tools that can support both
fault and success model development and also be used as a diagnostic aid in a quantitative and qualitative 
manner.  A functional diagram is the most effective manner in relaying this information.  We suggest that 
a functional diagram tied to a success tree be used as a front-end for analysts, operators, and management.
The prospective tool should be able to demonstrate Failure Modes and Effects information in a graphical 
3D manner. 
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Another aspect to communication is the ability to easily communicate procedures and safety
considerations via text and animations.  The integrated tool should provide animations that display
general maintenance and recovery information.  Special corrective measures or complex installations
should be available to reduce maintenance times and potential reworking.
CONCLUSIONS
Real-time risk and fault management is a critical function of the anomaly resolution process for the 
International Space Station Mission Evaluation Room. The ability to efficiently identify and evaluate on-
orbit anomalies, and to formulate and evaluate potential corrective actions is essential for the safe
operation of the International Space Station.  Current anomaly resolution activities in the MER depend on 
the effective teamwork of a large number of subsystems engineers and risk specialists.  While the current 
approach has been honed in the operation of NASA manned missions for more than 40 years, there is 
always the possibility that a critical factor can be overlooked and serious consequences result.
Computer technology may be part of the answer for more efficient and reliable anomaly resolution for 
space operations.  Computers are already invaluable tools for collecting and distributing information 
about anomalies in progress, and bringing the results of past events and risk assessments to bear for 
resolution of the current situation.  However, effective use of computer technology to directly support the
analytic processes of real-time risk and fault management is just beginning.
The nuclear industry has been exploring promising approaches for real-time risk and fault 
management in the twenty five years since the accident at Three Mile Island.  The Critical Safety
Function approach has proven to be a powerful paradigm for accident management in nuclear power 
plants.  To date this approach has primarily been applied in the form of hard copy emergency procedures.
The implementation of critical function methods as computer-based tools for risk and fault management
has been limited because of the difficulties of licensing software tools for performing safety-related
functions in commercial NPPs.  However, a wealth of research and development experience has been 
generated that hints at the promise of these methods for application to space operations. 
This study has explored the current processes for real-time risk and fault management in the ISS 
Mission Evaluation Room, and developed recommendations for the use of software tools to assist these 
processes.  Recommendations have been developed for building upon the Galileo fault tree tools to form a 
full-featured tool for fault isolation and failure analysis.  A Mission Success Framework that combines the 
features of critical function modeling with the fault tree tool has been proposed to form the foundation of
an integrated Risk Monitor for real-time risk and fault management in the ISS Mission Evaluation Room.
The Columbia accident has once again demonstrated the absolute necessity for effective risk 
management processes for manned space operations.  It is our hope that organizing system and risk 
knowledge within a logical framework focusing on mission success may provide one of the risk
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